


Weaponizing International Sports: Can Punishing Countries in the Sports Realm Compel Them to Change Their Behavior?

Online Appendix

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Figure 1: Timeline of the Iraq Case



1 Government Interference in Iraq

In May of 2008, the Iraqi government suspended its National Olympic Committee and replaced it with a new committee that had close ties to the government (Tawfeeqand and Karadsheh 2008). This type of action is strictly prohibited under the International Olympic Committee charter. The National Olympic Committees are supposed to advance the Olympic Movement, not the agendas of their national governments. In response to this development, the International Olympic Committee decided to ban Iraq from the 2008 Olympics.

Following the decision, Iraq promised to hold free and fair elections for a new National Olympic Committee (ABC NY 2008). This concession satisfied the International Olympic Committee, who lifted the ban five days after it was initially put in place. Iraq was allowed to compete in the 2008 Olympics. However, the temporary ban caused several Iraqi athletes to miss their deadlines to register, and most of these individuals were not able to compete. Iraq held elections for its new National Olympic Committee in April 2009 (Yacoub 2009).

Evaluating the Sanctions

The sports sanctions clearly succeeded in this case. Iraq had fallen out of compliance with the IOC Rules, but they were able to reach a deal that got them reinstated for the 2008 Olympics, under the condition that they made the necessary reforms. The case reinforces the point that sports sanctions can be effective when they address issues related to sports governance.



2 Government Interference in Indonesia

In June of 2015, FIFA suspended Indonesia over government interference in its domestic soccer leagues (Schonhardt and Rachman 2015). The country had two competing domestic soccer leagues that had been working to merge together since 2012. The Indonesian government was at odds with the Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI) regarding the eligibility of two soccer clubs that had disputed ownership (Jakarta Post 2015). FIFA deemed this government involvement as unjustified interference and banned Indonesia as a result.

Because of the suspension, Indonesia could not play qualification games for the 2018 World Cup or 2019 Asian Cup. The ban was lifted after about a year, when the Supreme Court of Indonesia ruled the government’s interference was not legal (BBC 2016). The decision brought Indonesia into compliance with FIFA demands, resolving the dispute.

Evaluating the Sanctions


The Indonesian government changed its behavior due to the court ruling rather than the sanctions themselves. Despite the sanctions being in place for about a year, the government resisted the pressure. The main questions are (1) whether the sanctions played a role in bringing about the court ruling and (2) whether the sanctions played an important role despite not bringing

about change by themselves.

Regarding (1) whether the sanctions played a role in bringing about the court ruling, there is no compelling evidence to support that they did. The rulings of the Jakarta Administrative Court (Jakarta Post 2015b) and the Supreme Court (Karensa 2016) both stated that the decree issued by the sports ministry suspending the Indonesian Soccer Association was not legal. The Youth and Sports Ministry was considered to have acted beyond its authority and contrary to good governance principles (Jakarta Post 2015b). These legal concerns seem to have been the key factor behind the decision of the Indonesian courts.

Regarding (2) whether the sanctions played an important role despite not bringing about change by themselves, the details of the case seem to suggest that they did not. After the sanctions were announced, President Joko Widodo appeared to be largely indifferent to them, pointing out that Indonesia was ranked around 150 by FIFA and did not have a realistic chance of succeeding at the World Cup or AFC Championship (Jakarta Post 2015a). As he put it, “It doesn’t matter if we are absent from international competitions for a while as long as we can win big in the future” (Jakarta Post 2015a).

Figure 3: Timeline of the India Case




3 Government Interference in India

In May of 2012, India was banned from the Olympics because of government interference and corruption in its National Olympic Committee (Grohmann 2012). Its government initially resisted the sanctions, but it reversed course after about a year and made the necessary reforms. India was able to enter the 2014 Olympics, although it missed the first few days of competition. During that period, its athletes had to compete under the Olympic flag. Therefore, similar to the Iraq (2008) case, India was banned temporarily, but it did not actually miss an Olympics because of the ban.

Evaluating the Sanctions

The case was clearly a success. Although initially obstinate, the Indian government made the necessary reforms, including holding fair elections to choose new members of the National Olympic Committee. The fact that the reforms came just in time for India to participate in the Sochi Olympics provides further evidence that the key impetus for the reforms was the sports sanctions. The case is thus another clear example of sports sanctions' ability to stop undue government influence in sports, and it did not result in India missing the Olympics.

Figure 4: Timeline of the Guatemala Case



4 Corruption in Guatemala

Guatemala's National Football Federation (Fedefut) was suspended on 28 October 2016. FIFA had started to investigate Fedefut after its former president was arrested on racketeering charges in December 2015. An in-depth investigation revealed several wrong-doings, which led FIFA to set up an oversight body and demand that Fedefut statutes be aligned with FIFA's (Guy 2018). Fedefut, and later the Autonomous Sports Confederation of Guatemala (CDAG), refused to approve the FIFA-mandated statutes. Fedefut also refused to authorize the operation of FIFA's oversight body, the so-called "normalization committee", until July 2017. This led FIFA to impose a ban on the organization (*Business Standard* 2018).

The sanctions ended access to funds and training courses provided by FIFA, and prevented Guatemalan teams from competing internationally. In April 2018, CDAG approved the Fedefut statutes that were aligned with the requirements of FIFA and Concacaf (Meléndez 2018). On 18 May, 2018, FIFA once again set up a normalization committee. On 31 May, FIFA lifted Fedefut's ban, after the normalization committee was confirmed to be operational (*Business Standard* 2018).

Evaluating the Sanctions

The FIFA sanctions imposed on Guatemala were effective. Both the amendment of Fedefut statutes and the operation of the normalization committee were specific demands made by FIFA in order for the ban to be lifted. Guatemala's compliance with these specific demands indicates that its reforms in football were a result of FIFA sanctions.


This causal relationship is further supported by the fact that there were no other reforms taking place in Guatemalan football between 2016 and 2018, other than those specifically demanded by FIFA. The changes therefore cannot be considered part of a broader reform movement. Indeed, the head of the FIFA oversight committee established in December 2015 (Adela de Torrebiarte) suggested in an interview with the New York Times that football in Guatemala would not change without the intervention of FIFA (Witz 2016).

5 Government Interference in Pakistan

In October of 2017, FIFA suspended Pakistan for government interference in its national football federation (FIFA 2017; Homewood and Bukhari 2017). Two internal factions had been competing for control over this organization since 2015. One of the factions was led by a former politician, Faisal Saleh Hayat, who was facing corruption allegations. The other faction was led by an individual with ties to the government and who was accused of helping his political allies seize control of the national football federation. In 2015, the government took control of the organization, after Hayat won a disputed election to be the organization's leader. FIFA viewed this action as government interference and repeatedly warned Pakistan that it would be banned from international football if the government did not relinquish control.

After FIFA's warnings were continuously disregarded, it banned Pakistan in October 2017 (Din 2018). It stated that the suspension would be lifted once control of the football federa-

Figure 5: Timeline of the Pakistan Case




tion’s offices and accounts were restored to Hayat (Khan 2017). The sanctions sparked domestic outrage against the Pakistani government, and many fans took to the streets to protest the government’s mishandling of the situation (BBC 2018). About 6 months later, in March 2018, the Pakistani government ended its interference in the organization (Reuters 2018b). Shortly afterward, FIFA lifted the sanctions on Pakistan.

Evaluating the Sanctions

The sanctions appear to have been effective at achieving their stated goal of ending government involvement in the national football federation. Under domestic pressure, the government complied with the specific demands of the sanctions. Furthermore, no clear alternative factors seem to have motivated the government to change its behavior. The case therefore supports the notion that sports sanctions can compel countries to change their behavior when it comes to issues related to sports.

6 Government Interference in Nigeria (2010)

Following Nigeria’s winless first-round exit from the African Cup of Nations in June of 2010, the Nigerian government banned the team from future competitions and disbanded the Nigerian



Football Federation (Reuters 2010). FIFA told the government to end its interference in its national sports organization, but the interference continued. Several months later, FIFA banned Nigeria from international football due to continued interference (Reuters 2010). FIFA lifted the ban just two days later, after the autonomy of the Nigerian Football Federation had been restored (Reuters 2010; RNZ 2010).


Evaluating the Sanctions

The sanctions were clearly effective. The government changed its behavior almost immediately after the sanctions were imposed. In addition, no other alternative factors appear to have led to the policy change, and it was done in isolation rather than being part of a broader package of reforms. In sum, this case appears to confirm that sports sanctions can compel countries to change their behavior in the sporting realm.

7 Government Interference in Nigeria (2014)

On July 9, 2014, FIFA again banned Nigeria from international football due to government interference (CNN 2014). After Nigeria’s national team was eliminated from the World Cup, the

Figure 7: Timeline of the Nigeria (2014) Case



Nigeria Football Federation (NFF) was dissolved and replaced by a sole administrator on July 3, 2014. The government of Nigeria stated that these actions had been authorized by an order of interlocutory injunction and were necessary as long as legal proceedings were underway against the NFF. Upon return from the World Cup on July 4, the NFF's President was also detained (Okeleji 2014).

FIFA warned that all of the above actions went against FIFA's statutes, which require member organizations to act independently. Moreover, in accordance with its statutes, FIFA could only recognize appointments made in light of an elective congress convened by the NFF. As a result, it demanded that the NFF's leadership be reinstated by July 8 (Okeleji 2014). As this deadline was not met, the NFF was suspended on July 9, 2014. However, it was reinstated on July 18 once the order of interlocutory injunction and court proceedings against the NFF were withdrawn (Guardian 2014).


Evaluating the Sanctions

The sanctions imposed on Nigeria in July 2014 were effective. Nigeria complied with FIFA's conditions for lifting the sanctions. Namely, the court actions had been withdrawn and the prop-

erly elected NFF Executive Committee, the NFF general assembly, and the NFF administration were allowed to continue working without interference (CNN 2014).

The Nigerian government had shown concern for the sanctions by attempting to defend its actions in light of FIFA criticism. Nigeria's Minister of Sports, Tammy Danagogo, stated "we will do our best to make FIFA know that there has been no government interference; we have no such intention" (Inyang 2014). In addition, the Nigerian women's team was due to compete in the FIFA Under-20 Women's World Cup, where the team was believed to have a strong chance of winning (Kassouf 2014). Nigeria therefore had clear incentive to lift the ban in time for the team to be able to participate.

Finally, there were no other factors and no sport reforms that were taking place at the time that would have explained Nigeria's compliance with the specific demands. In sum, the Nigeria 2014 case is another example of how sports sanctions are effective when their demands are related to sports governance.




8 Government Interference in Benin

In May of 2016, the government in Benin impeded an election in its national soccer federation (BBC Sport 2016a). FIFA deemed this action government interference and banned the country, stating that Benin would be reinstated once elections were held (BBC Sport 2016b). Benin quickly rescheduled its election to avoid having to forfeit an upcoming African Cup of Nations qualifier against Equatorial Guinea, which was scheduled to take place the following month (BBC Sport 2016b). FIFA announced that Benin could participate in the match, which was scheduled for June 12, if they held elections by June 11 (BBC Sport 2016b). The elections took place on June 10, and the ban against Benin was lifted the next day (FIFA 2016; BBC Sport 2016b).

Evaluating the Sanctions

The sanctions were clearly effective. The government in Benin came into compliance, and it did so just in time to play the June 12 qualifier against Equatorial Guinea. There were also no clear alternative explanations or parallel reforms. In sum, the timeline and CPOs of this case suggest that the FIFA ban played the key causal role in bringing about compliance.

Figure 9: Timeline of the Sierra Leone Case



9 Government Interference in Sierra Leone

The suspension of the Sierra Leone Football Association (SLFA) that was in place between the October 5, 2018 and June 3, 2019 is yet another example of a sports sanction that was imposed in response to government interference (Edwards 2019).

On September 12, 2018, the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) of Sierra Leone asked the SLFA President, Isha Johansen, and the SLFA's General Secretary, Christopher Kamara, to step down from their positions, as they were under investigation for corruption. Although such actions were in accordance with Sierra Leone law, FIFA's Secretary General wrote in a letter to the SLFA that member organizations must act independently, according to its statutes. The removal of the SLFA's President and General Secretary were therefore brought to the attention of the Bureau of the FIFA Council (BBC 2018).

The Bureau of the FIFA Council found that these actions constituted government interference and decided to suspend the SLFA. Sierra Leone's teams were banned from participating in international competition and were excluded from development programmes, courses, and training from FIFA or CAF. FIFA further stated that the suspension would be lifted only once the SLFA's President and General Secretary confirmed that they had full control over the SLFA (FIFA 2018). However, a FIFA statement issued later in October clarified that the removal of

sanctions would be considered only once the corruption case had been concluded. The ban was finally removed a few days after the High Court of Sierra Leone had acquitted the SLFA President and General Secretary of all charges, as this allowed them to return to their posts (FIFA 2019).


Evaluating the Sanctions

It is unclear whether the FIFA sanctions were successful. While the SLFA had complied with FIFA demands, it is difficult to determine the degree to which FIFA sanctions had played a causal role in bringing about this compliance.

On the one hand, there are CPOs that support the notion that the sanctions played an important causal role. Sierra Leone's President expressed concern regarding the sanctions (Barrie 2019), and the SLFA tried to appeal FIFA's suspension (Thomas 2018), reflecting the significance of the sanctions for Sierra Leone officials. Furthermore, domestic discontent with the state's handling of the sanctions was also present, although it is unclear how widespread it was and whether it gave rise to domestic pressure (Soccer Laduma 2019).

On the other hand, government backlash at the time (Reuters 2018a) was indicative of Sierra Leone's reluctance to comply with FIFA demands. Moreover, had the High Court found the officials guilty, they would not have been allowed to return to their posts. It is equally unclear the extent to which FIFA sanctions had contributed to the conclusion of the corruption cases. As a result, it is difficult to claim that FIFA sanctions played an important causal role in bringing about the SLFA's compliance.

Figure 10: Timeline of the Cameroon Case



10 Government Interference in Cameroon

On July 4, 2013, the Cameroonian Football Association (FECAFOOT) was banned from international competition by FIFA, following accusations of political interference in the football association’s elections (Bongben 2013a). These elections almost failed to take place at all, when Cameroonian Sports Minister Adoum Garoua moved to temporarily suspend the elections on March 26th, in order to allow the Ministry of Sport to conduct a “consultation exercise”, which would consist of consultations that would “streamline the electoral process” (Bongben 2013b). FIFA warned the Cameroonian government against taking this action, stating it would amount to government interference, and allowing them until April 9 to reverse their decision before facing a ban (Bongben 2013b). It seems the warning was sufficient in deterring the Ministry of Sport from conducting consultations that would subsequently delay the FECAFOOT elections. Thereafter, the elections took place on June 19 (Imray 2013).

The results led to the re-election of former FECAFOOT president Mohammed Iya, who was placed under arrest just nine days prior, on June 10 (Bongben 2013a), for alleged financial mismanagement (Imray 2013). On June 27, FECAFOOT’s elections were invalidated, despite FIFA having already approved the elections (Bongben 2013a). The next day, one of

the many individuals who contested for the role of President, FECAFOOT Vice President John Begheni Ndeh, who was also former transport minister (BBC Sport 2013), forcibly occupied FECAFOOT headquarters utilizing security forces and declared himself president (BBC Sport 2013).

It is this action, the occupation of FECAFOOT's headquarters with security forces, that FIFA deemed a clear interference of the Cameroonian authorities in the internal affairs of FECAFOOT (BBC Sport 2013). Cameroon was subsequently banned, and remained blocked from all international football, at the national or club level (Imray 2013), for the 3 weeks that proceeded.

Through discussions between the Cameroonian government and FIFA, the parties were eventually able to appoint a Normalization Committee (NC) to oversee FECAFOOT until new elections could take place (Bongben 2013c). Thus, on July 22, FIFA issued a statement lifting the ban on Cameroon.

Evaluating the Sanctions

This case demonstrates that, in some instances, even the mere threat of a ban from international competition is seemingly effective in altering the course of action undertaken by domestic associations who govern sports. This was made clear by the Sport Minister's decision to avoid delaying the elections, and proceeding with them on June 19th.

The final ban implemented on July 4th can be considered a success, as FIFA and FECAFOOT were able to collectively establish an interim power (the NC) to oversee new elections, and end the perceived government interference in Cameroonian football. The ban, which encompassed national and club football, came at a key time during Cameroon's World Cup Qualifying stage (Homewood 2013). Thus, there was additional incentive to abide by FIFA's rulings, in order to recommence matches to qualify for the FIFA 2014 World Cup in Rio. In


fact, the ban was announced precisely 15 minutes after Cameroon received news that they were top of their qualifying group (Homewood 2013). This timing, alongside Cameroon's realistic prospects for World Cup qualification, likely aided FIFA in pushing FECAFOOT to mobilize in accordance with their legislation and satisfy FIFA's conditions. This once again demonstrates the ability for sports sanctions to generate change in issues related to sports governance.

11 Partial Case: Women's Rights in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has long maintained discriminatory policies towards women. In the area of sports, women were not given physical education in state schools and were not encouraged to practice sport in public. As a result, they were forced to play in underground leagues, women's gyms were not granted authorisations to operate, and women were not supported to participate in international sporting events (*Human Rights Watch* 2012).

Saudi Arabia's treatment of women in sports contravened the International Olympic Committee's (IOC) charter which states that sport is a right for everyone and bans gender discrimination in practicing sports. As a result, the IOC began pressuring Saudi Arabia in 2012 to include female athletes on its Olympic team. Saudi Arabia sent two female athletes to the 2012 London Summer Olympics (Peralta 2012).

Furthermore, in 2014 the IOC introduced a set of reforms called Olympic Agenda 2020, which established gender equality as one of the key goals of the Olympic Movement. Moreover, in 2015 IOC President Thomas Bach stated, "a commitment to 'non-discrimination' will be mandatory for all countries hoping to bid for the Olympics in the future . . . countries like Saudi Arabia must really work to allow female athletes to freely participate." As a result, the President rejected a suggestion by Saudi Arabia to co-host a sex segregated Olympic Games with Bahrain (*Human Rights Watch* 2016).



Saudi Arabia has since taken further steps to reduce gender discrimination in the realm of sports. Since August 1 2016, the General Authority for Sports of Saudi Arabia has introduced a new female department and appointed a female (Princess Reema Bint Bandar Al Saud) as the head. Female spectators are also allowed to attend sports events in stadiums since 2018, and a women's football league was created in 2020.

Evaluating the Pressure Campaign:

Although the IOC's efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to have women on their Olympic team did not amount to a case of sport sanctions, it is nevertheless worth analyzing. It is an example of how the IOC, through pressure, was able to quickly bring about a change in government behavior in order to end violations of the Olympic Charter. This is similar to the case of simply threatening sanctions in the instance of Cameroon. Even though a Saudi Arabian female athlete had competed at the Youth Olympics in 2010, she had entered on her own and had not formed part of the official Olympic delegation. Female participation in sport was a controversial issue at

the time in Saudi Arabia. When the Ministry of Education announced in 2011 plans to introduce physical education in girls' state-run schools, this provoked the backlash of conservative clerics (Peralta 2012). Therefore, it may have taken years for Saudi Arabia to decide to send female athletes to the Olympic Games had it not been for IOC pressure.

The IOC later made a strong commitment to establishing the removal of gender discrimination in sport as a prerequisite for any future bids to host the Olympics. Although a form of sanctions, the ban did not amount to a major case of sport sanctions, as it did not constitute a ban from the world's most visible sporting events. Nevertheless, it is worth analyzing, as it is an interesting example of how sports sanctions have been used to attempt to bring about important social change.

At first glance, the sequence of events would suggest that the IOC sanctions were effective. Following the IOC's rejection of Saudi Arabia's bid to co-host the Olympic Games in 2015, Saudi Arabia took several important steps to reduce gender discrimination in sport, as laid out in the previous section. Moreover, although Saudi Arabia claims to have begun to provide men and women with equal opportunities to participate in sports and physical education in 2003, it had also implemented discriminatory measures since then. For instance, in 2009 and 2010, Saudi Arabia closed several women's gyms. In addition, although in 2011 Saudi Arabia announced plans to introduce physical education for girls in state schools, only in 2017 did the plan turn into tangible action and Saudi Arabia allowed girls to play sports in public schools (*Human Rights Watch* 2012). It can thus be hypothesized that the IOC's sanctions played a significant role in pushing for reforms in sport.

However, this hypothesis is not supported by many CPOs. Namely, while Saudi Arabia did carry out reforms to reduce gender discrimination in sport, it did not do so through cooperation with the IOC. While the IOC expressed that countries that wanted to host the Olympics needed to comply with rules surrounding gender discrimination, they did not specify the reforms that

Saudi Arabia needed to implement, nor assist Saudi Arabia in ending discrimination as soon as possible (*Human Rights Watch* 2016). Cooperation with the IOC would have suggested that the sport reforms were primarily intended to remove IOC sanctions, a conclusion that is now difficult to support, especially taking into account other possible explanations.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia's reforms in sport seem to form part of an initiative to socially and economically transform the kingdom, called Saudi Vision 2030. The framework states that it seeks to unlock the "talent, potential and dedication of . . . young men and women." Vision 2030 seeks to increase female participation in all aspects of Saudi life. Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman, who is believed to be the de facto ruler of the kingdom, has pursued this goal by granting Saudi women more rights at an accelerated pace. Since the Crown Prince came to power in 2017, women have been allowed to drive and participate more in the workforce. The relaxation of the male guardianship law has also made women more independent (Hubbard and Yee 2019).

That sports reforms are part of a wider reform initiative is also evidenced by official statements. When Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Education announced that public girls' schools would offer physical education programs starting in the fall of 2017, it stated that the decision was made in fulfilment of the Global Goals of Saudi Vision 2030 (*Beyond Sport* 2017). In sum, while the IOC's sport sanctions and pressures seem to have causally contributed to reducing gender discrimination in sport, at least at an accelerated rate, they may have done so to a lesser degree than other factors, such as the broader socio-political context.

12 Partial Case: Boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics

In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, beginning a nine year occupation that featured numerous war crimes and human rights abuses. In response, 65 countries refused

First, the government refused to acknowledge that the boycott movement had resulted from its war in Afghanistan. It instead blamed the boycott on President Carter trying to boost his domestic support and the United States not wanting to see Moscow stage a successful Olympics (Guttman 1988). Four years later, the Soviets boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. They accused the United States government of spreading anti-Soviet propaganda and failing to provide a safe environment for athletes. However, it is believed by many that the 1984 boycott was a direct retaliation for the 1980 boycott (Guttman 1988; Cottrell and Nelson 2011).

In conclusion, the boycott clearly failed to cause the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. Instead, it appears to have intensified hostilities between the Soviets and the West.

13 Causal Process Observations (CPOs) Complete List

Rhodesia (1966-79)

Compliance: Yes (Rowe 2001; Evans 2007)

Government Concerns: Yes (Little 2011)

Failed Alternatives: Yes (Little 2011)

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: Yes (Little 2011)

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: No evidence of other reforms found

Only Factor: No (civil war, economic sanctions)–(Rowe 2001; Evans 2007; Little 2011)

Non-compliance: No (Rowe 2001; Evans 2007)

Government Indifference: No (Little 2011)

Successful Alternatives: No (Little 2011)

Successful Mitigation: No (Little 2011)

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No evidence found

Other Factor(s): Yes (civil war, economic sanctions)–(Rowe 2001; Evans 2007; Little 2011)

Defiance: No (Rowe 2001; Evans 2007)

Rally Around the Flag: Yes (Little 2011)

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: Yes (Little 2011)

South Africa (1957-1981)

Compliance: Partial (Hawley 1977; Lapchic 1979; Booth 1990; Merrett 2005; Tatz 1983)

Government Concerns: Yes (Lapchic 1979; Merrett 2005)

Failed Alternatives: Yes (Lapchic 1979; Kelley 1984)

Athlete Reinstatement: Yes (Merrett 2005)

Domestic Pressure: Yes (Hawley 1977); No (Merrett 2005)

Failed Mitigation: Yes (Merrett 2005)

Attribution: Yes (Lapchic 1979; Kelley 1984)

Isolated Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms—Democratization came later (Kelley 1984)

Only Factor: No (e.g., economic sanctions, civil unrest) (Little 2011)

Non-compliance: No (Lapchic 1979; Merrett 2005)

Government Indifference: No (Lapchic 1979; Merrett 2005)

Successful Alternatives: No (Lapchic 1979; Merrett 2005; Kelley 1984)

Successful Mitigation: No (Lapchic 1979; Kelley 1984)

Athlete Indifference: No (Lapchic 1979)

Public Indifference: No (Lapchic 1979)

Parallel Reforms: No—Democratization came later

Other Factor(s): Yes (e.g., economic sanctions, civil unrest) (Little 2011)

Defiance: No (Booth 1990)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: Yes (Lapchic 1979; Kelley 1984; Tatz 1983)

Public Backlash: No evidence found

South Africa (1982-1991)

Compliance: Yes (Haysom 2002; Little 2011)

Government Concerns: Yes (Merrett 2005)

Failed Alternatives: Yes (Booth 1990)

Athlete Reinstatement: Yes (Krieger 2017)

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: Yes (Merrett 2005)

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: No

Only Factor: No (e.g., economic sanctions, civil unrest) (Haysom 2002)

Non-compliance: No (Haysom 2002; Little 2011)

Government Indifference: No (Merrett 2005)

Successful Alternatives: No (Booth 1990)

Successful Mitigation: No (Merrett 2005)

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No (Little 2011)

Parallel Reforms: No

Other Factor(s): Yes (e.g., economic sanctions, civil unrest) (Haysom 2002)

Defiance: No (Haysom 2002; Little 2011)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Indonesia (1963-1966)

Compliance: Yes (Goldblatt 2016; Kobiarecki 2016)

Government Concerns: Yes (Pauker 1965)

Failed Alternatives: Yes (Goldblatt 2016; Kobierecki 2016)

Athlete Reinstatement: Yes (Kobierecki 2016)

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: Yes (Kobierecki 2016)

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: No (leadership transition in Indonesia)

Only Factor: No (e.g., worsening Chino-Indonesian relations) (Kobierecki 2016)

Non-compliance: No (Goldblatt 2016; Kobierecki 2016)

Government Indifference: No (Pauker 1965)

Successful Alternatives: No (Goldblatt 2016; Kobierecki 2016)

Successful Mitigation: No (Kobierecki 2016)

Athlete Indifference: No (Kobierecki 2016)

Public Indifference: No (Goldblatt 2016)

Parallel Reforms: Yes (leadership transition in Indonesia)

Other Factor(s): Yes (e.g., worsening Chino-Indonesian relations) (Kobierecki 2016)

Defiance: No (Goldblatt 2016; Kobierecki 2016)

Rally Around the Flag: Yes (Kobierecki 2016)

Government Backlash: Yes (Pauker 1965)

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Britain (1985-1991)

Compliance: Yes (Burnton 2020)

Government Concerns: No (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Failed Alternatives: No (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Athlete Reinstatement: No (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: No (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Attribution: Yes (by the government) (Burnton 2020)

Isolated Reforms: Yes (Burnton 2020)

Only Factor: No (Burnton 2020)

Non-compliance: No (Burnton 2020)

Government Indifference: No (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Successful Alternatives: No (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Successful Mitigation: No (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Athlete Indifference: Yes (McKie 1985; DeYoung 1985)

Public Indifference: No (Burnton 2020)

Parallel Reforms: No (Burnton 2020)

Other Factor(s): Yes (Burnton 2020)

Defiance: No—McKie (1985); DeYoung (1985)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No—McKie (1985); DeYoung (1985)

Public Backlash: Yes (but limited) (Burnton 2020)

Yugoslavia (1992-1995)

Compliance: Yes

Government Concerns: No (Dimitrijević and Pejić 1995)

Failed Alternatives: No

Athlete Reinstatement: No. By National Olympic Committee only (Bubnjević 2012)

Domestic Pressure: Yes

Failed Mitigation: No. By National Olympic Committee only (Bubnjević 2012)

Attribution: No

Isolated Reforms: No

Only Factor: No (economic sanctions, civil war)

Non-compliance: No

Government Indifference: Yes (Dimitrijević and Pejić 1995)

Successful Alternatives: No

Successful Mitigation: No

Athlete Indifference: Yes

Public Indifference: No (Mills 2009)

Parallel Reforms: Yes

Other Factor(s): Yes (economic sanctions, civil war)

Defiance: No

Rally Around the Flag: Yes (Rosić 2017)

Government Backlash: Yes (Dimitrijević and Pejić 1995)

Public Backlash: Yes (Nešić 2017)

Afghanistan (1999-2002)

Compliance: Yes (after regime change)

Government Concerns: Yes (McCarthy 2000; Associated Press 2000)

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: Yes (McCarthy 2000; Associated Press 2000)

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: Yes (McCarthy 2000; Associated Press 2000)

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: No (regime change)

Only Factor: No (invasion)

Non-compliance: No

Government Indifference: No (McCarthy 2000; Associated Press 2000)

Successful Alternatives: No (McCarthy 2000; Associated Press 2000)

Successful Mitigation: No (McCarthy 2000; Associated Press 2000)

Athlete Indifference: No (McCarthy 2000; Associated Press 2000)

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: Yes (democratization)

Other Factor(s): Yes (invasion)

Defiance: No

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: Yes (McCarthy 2000)

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Iraq (2008)

Compliance: Yes (ABC News 2008; Yacoub 2009)

Government Concerns: Yes (NBC News 2008)

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: Yes (NBC News 2008)

Domestic Pressure: Yes (NBC News 2008)

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: Yes (ABC News 2008)

Isolated Reforms: Yes

Only Factor: Yes

Non-compliance: No (ABC News 2008; Yacoub 2009)

Government Indifference: No (NBC News 2008)

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No (NBC News 2008)

Public Indifference: No (NBC News 2008)

Parallel Reforms: No evidence found

Other Factor(s): No evidence found

Defiance: No (ABC News 2008; Yacoub 2009)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found (NBC News 2008)

Government Backlash: Yes (NBC News 2008)

Public Backlash: No evidence found (NBC News 2008)

Kuwait (2010-2018)

Compliance: Yes (Etchells 2019; MacKay 2012)

Government Concerns: Yes (Grohmann 2016)

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No (Butler 2016; Bisson, 2021)

Domestic Pressure: Yes (Butler 2017)

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: Yes (Grohmann 2017)

Isolated Reforms: Yes

Only Factor: Yes

Non-compliance: No (MacKay 2012; Etchells 2019)

Government Indifference: No (Grohmann 2016; Butler 2016)

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: Yes (Palmer 2015)

Public Indifference: No (Butler 2017)

Parallel Reforms: No

Other Factor(s): No

Defiance: No

Rally Around the Flag: No

Government Backlash: Yes (Grohmann 2016)

Public Backlash: Yes (Culpepper 2016)

India (2012-2014)

Compliance: Yes (BBC 2014)

Government Concerns: Yes (Times of India 2019)

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: Yes (BBC 2012)

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: Yes (Times of India 2019)

Isolated Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms

Only Factor: No evidence found of other factors

Non-compliance: No (BBC 2014)

Government Indifference: No (BBC 2014; Times of India 2019)

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No evidence found

Other Factor(s): No evidence found

Defiance: No (BBC 2014)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: Yes (Grohmann 2012)

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Russia (2018-Present)

Compliance: No (Reuters Staff 2019; WADA 2019)

Government Concerns: Yes (Maese 2016)

Failed Alternatives: No

Athlete Reinstatement: Yes (Maese 2016; Pashaeva 2021)

Domestic Pressure: No

Failed Mitigation: No

Attribution: No

Isolated Reforms: No

Only Factor:

Non-compliance: Yes (Reuters Staff 2019; WADA 2019)

Government Indifference: No

Successful Alternatives: No

Successful Mitigation: Yes (Pashaeva 2021)

Athlete Indifference: No

Public Indifference: No (Pashaeva 2021)

Parallel Reforms: No

Other Factor(s): No

Defiance: No

Rally Around the Flag: Yes (Pashaeva 2021)

Government Backlash: Yes (Maese 2016; Pashaeva 2021)

Public Backlash: Yes (Ponars Eurasia 2016)

Guatemala (2016)

Compliance: Yes

Government Concerns: No evidence

Failed Alternatives: No evidence

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence

Domestic Pressure: No evidence

Failed Mitigation: No evidence

Attribution: Yes

Isolated Reforms: No evidence of other reforms found

Only Factor: Yes

Non-compliance: No evidence found
Government Indifference: No evidence found
Successful Alternatives: No evidence found
Successful Mitigation: No evidence found
Athlete Indifference: No evidence found
Public Indifference: No
Parallel Reforms: No evidence found
Other Factor(s): No evidence found

Defiance: No
Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found
Government Backlash: No evidence found
Public Backlash: No evidence found

Pakistan (2017-18)

Compliance: Yes (RNZ 2010)
Government Concerns: No evidence found
Failed Alternatives: No evidence found
Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found
Domestic Pressure: Yes (Tusdiq 2018)
Failed Mitigation: No evidence found
Attribution: No evidence found
Isolated Reforms: Yes
Only Factor: Yes

Non-compliance: No (RNZ 2010)

Government Indifference: No evidence found
Successful Alternatives: No (BBC 2018)
Successful Mitigation: No (BBC 2018)
Athlete Indifference: No evidence found
Public Indifference: No (BBC 2018)
Parallel Reforms: No evidence of other reforms found
Other Factor(s): No evidence of other factors found

Defiance: No evidence found
Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found
Government Backlash: No evidence found
Public Backlash: No evidence found

Indonesia (2016)

Compliance: Yes (delayed) (BBC 2016)
Government Concerns: No (Jakarta Post 2015a)
Failed Alternatives: No evidence found
Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found
Domestic Pressure: No evidence found
Failed Mitigation: No evidence found
Attribution: No evidence found
Isolated Reforms: Yes (BBC 2016)
Only Factor: No (BBC 2016)

Non-compliance: No (BBC 2016)
Government Indifference: Yes (Jakarta Post 2015a)

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No (BBC 2016)

Other Factor(s): Yes (BBC 2016)

Defiance: No (BBC 2016)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Nigeria (2010)

Compliance: Yes (Reuters 2010; RNZ 2010)

Government Concerns: No evidence found

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: Yes

Only Factor: Yes

Non-compliance: No (Reuters 2010; RNZ 2010)

Government Indifference: No evidence found

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No

Other Factor(s): No

Defiance: No (Reuters 2010; RNZ 2010)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Nigeria (2014)

Compliance: Yes (Guardian 2014; CNN 2014)

Government Concerns: Yes (Inyang 2014)

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: Yes

Only Factor: Yes

Non-compliance: No (Guardian 2014; CNN 2014)

Government Indifference: No (Inyang 2014)

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No

Other Factor(s): No

Defiance: No (Guardian 2014; CNN 2014)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Benin (2016)

Compliance: Yes (FIFA 2016; BBC Sport 2016b)

Government Concerns: No evidence found

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms

Only Factor: No evidence found of other factors

Non-compliance: No (FIFA 2016; BBC Sport 2016b)

Government Indifference: No evidence found

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms

Other Factor(s): No evidence found of other factors

Defiance: No (FIFA 2016; BBC Sport 2016b)

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Sierra Leone (2018-2019)

Compliance: Yes (FIFA 2018)

Government Concerns: Yes (Thomas 2018; Barrie 2019)

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: Unclear (Soccer Laduma 2019)

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms

Only Factor: No (FIFA 2019)

Non-compliance: No (FIFA 2019)

Government Indifference: No (Barrie 2019; Thomas 2018)

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No (Soccer Laduma 2019)

Parallel Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms

Other Factor(s): Yes (FIFA 2019)

Defiance: No evidence found

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: Yes (Reuters 2018a)

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Cameroon (2012)

Compliance: Yes (Bongben 2013c)

Government Concerns: Yes (Bongben 2013c)

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: No evidence found

Isolated Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms

Only Factor: No evidence found of other factors

Non-compliance: No (Bongben 2013c)

Government Indifference: No (Bongben 2013c)

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No evidence found of other reforms

Other Factor(s): No evidence found of other factors

Defiance: No evidence found

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Saudi Arabia (2012-present)

Compliance: Yes

Government Concerns: No evidence found

Failed Alternatives: No evidence found

Athlete Reinstatement: No evidence found

Domestic Pressure: No evidence found

Failed Mitigation: No evidence found

Attribution: No (Attribution to Saudi Vision 2030)

Isolated Reforms: No

Only Factor: No

Non-compliance: No

Government Indifference: No evidence found

Successful Alternatives: No evidence found

Successful Mitigation: No evidence found

Athlete Indifference: No evidence found

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: Yes. (Granting women's rights in other areas of Saudi life) (Hubbard and Yee 2019)

Other Factor(s): Yes (Saudi Vision 2030)

Defiance: No

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: No evidence found

Public Backlash: No evidence found

Moscow Boycott (1980)

Compliance: No (Guttman 1988)

Government Concerns: Yes

Failed Alternatives: No

Athlete Reinstatement: No

Domestic Pressure: No

Failed Mitigation: No

Attribution: No (no reforms)

Isolated Reforms: No (no reforms)

Only Factor: No

Non-compliance: Yes (Guttman 1988)

Government Indifference: No

Successful Alternatives: No

Successful Mitigation: Yes

Athlete Indifference: No

Public Indifference: No evidence found

Parallel Reforms: No (no reforms)

Other Factor(s): Yes

Defiance: No evidence found

Rally Around the Flag: No evidence found

Government Backlash: Yes (Guttmann 1988)

Public Backlash: No evidence found

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